Net Core Ask Question. Asked 1 year, 6 months ago. Active 1 year, 2 months ago. Viewed times. Here is the error that is thrown: The operation cannot be completed because a supported web service runtime is not present. Rob Rob 1 1 gold badge 1 1 silver badge 8 8 bronze badges. Add a comment. Active Oldest Votes. Beej Beej 1 1 1 silver badge 3 3 bronze badges.
And what about the old COM apis, how are you mapping those calls to. Have you found any solution yet? Sign up or log in Sign up using Google. Sign up using Facebook. Sign up using Email and Password.
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Thank you very much, your blog commenting lists are great help to me in building inbound links to my blog. I have not tried on Visual Studio , but in theory, it should work. Give it a try and let us know. Hi Sir. Did anyone manage to get the thing worked? Regards, Erik. But you need some configuration examples, i suppose! Download the source code of those projects and read the web. NET 2. Try both and find what work for you….
Thank you very much for your input and all the invested effort for helping me. Considering links that you have suggested, I have tried changing web. It became very frustrating now… Regards, Erik D. Thank you sir for all the effort helping me. But it just wont work. I have manually set the config as it should be, but the WSE method just wont appear in the generated Proxy. Your proxies should be generating WSE partial classes.
Maybe uninstall WSE and try again. See … […]. Hello, I cannot find the devenv. Hi blogger, i must say you have very interesting content here. Your website should go viral. You need initial traffic boost only. How to get it? Confirmed to be working on Visual studio Main point which I missed while configuration was following:.
Restart the Visual studio and you are good to go. You are commenting using your WordPress. You are commenting using your Google account. You are commenting using your Twitter account. You are commenting using your Facebook account. Notify me of new comments via email. Notify me of new posts via email.
This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed. NET development. Skip to content. WSE 3. VS WSE3. Visual Studio Devenv. WSE Setting 3. Rate this:. Share this blog:. Like this: Like Loading About Diganta Kumar. Coder says:. June 16, at am. Hanlet says:. March 3, at am. June 28, at am.
June 22, at am. Thanasekaran says:. October 22, at am. Vu Nguyen Hai Dang says:. May 9, at pm. The reference list inside this element points to the xenc:EncryptedData element containing a username token representing the client's credentials. This way the client's password does not appear in the clear on the wire. The last element in the Security header of the request is dsig:Signature, which signs all message parts that require integrity, the timestamp, and the plain text wsse:UsernameToken element encrypted within xenc:EncryptedData.
Note that the service's X. It is not required since both the client and the service have access to it. Instead, an external reference describing the properties of this certificate is used. The response message uses the symmetric key passed by the client to the service in the request to sign and encrypt the message. The Security header of the response contains the timestamp, an xenc:ReferenceList pointing to the encrypted message parts, and a signature signing the timestamp and parts of the message that require integrity protection.
UsernameForCertificateAssertion verifies that a response is signed and encrypted with the same symmetric key that was used on the request. This proves that the response was sent by the owner of the X. This mechanism allows the assertion to provide server authentication assurances on the client.
The wire format may be different depending on the integrity and confidentiality requirements as well as the assertion configuration. In particular, the layout will differ if you change the order in which the signature and encryption is applied to the message.
By default, the message is first signed and then encrypted. Using the MessageProtectionOrder property, you can also configure the assertion to first encrypt and then sign the message, or sign the message, encrypt it, and then encrypt the message signature. Another configurable aspect of the assertion is related to key derivation. By default, derived keys are not used, but you can change this using the RequireDerivedKeys property.
When this feature is turned on, each time a message is signed or encrypted using a symmetric key, a derived key is first computed based on this root symmetric key, and the signature or encryption uses the newly derived key.
In that case, you would see two additional elements in the Security header representing the derived key tokens used for signatures and encryption. By default this behavior is turned off, but you can use the RequireSignatureonfirmation property on the assertion to require that the recipient of the request confirms all signatures from the request in the response.
In this case, you would see additional wsse:SignatureConfirmation elements in the Security header of the response. This assertion relies on a secure transport protocol like HTTPS to provide integrity, confidentiality, and server authentication assurances. WSE does not enforce that the transport is actually secure when this assertion is applied, so you must exercise extra caution when using it. If the transport is not secure, the password will appear in plain text on the wire.
Configuration of UsernameOverTransportAssertion is minimal. On the server, no credential configuration is necessary, as server authentication is not performed at the SOAP level. Your XML policy file can be as simple as the following:. Again, for security reasons it is recommended you provide the credentials in code.
Since server authentication is handled at the transport layer, there is no need to provide the service's X. Given all that, your client-side XML policy can look identical to the one on the server side.
Note that, when UsernameOverTransportAssertion is applied, the username and associated password are sent over the wire in plain text within the Security header of the request message. It is therefore crucial that confidentiality is provided for the entire message at the transport level.
WSE provides three security assertions supporting authentication based on X. AnonymousForCertificateAssertion allows the client to remain anonymous while authenticating the service using its X. MutualCertificate10Assertion and MutualCertificate11Assertion both perform mutual authentication using the client and service's X. The difference between them is in the WS-Security specification features they use. However, this requires both communicating endpoints to support the newer WS-Security specification.
To use AnonymousForCertificateAssertion, both the client and service must be configured with the service's X. This certificate can be provided either through the XML policy file or through code. The wire format, shown in Figure 7 , is even simpler. Notice that the layout of the Security header of the request message is similar to that of UsernameForCertificateAssertion and the layout of the Security header of the response message is identical.
This way the client remains anonymous, while the service is authenticated with its X. Because the response message contains a reference to the encrypted key token from the request, AnonymousForCertificateAssertion therefore requires that both of the communicating parties support the WS-Security 1. The client's certificate can be provided in the XML policy file see Figure 8.
You can also omit the specification of the client's certificate in the XML file and provide it directly in code using the same SetClientCredential method I described earlier:. Figure 9 shows the effect of applying MutualCertificate11Assertion to the exchange. Compared with AnonymousForCertificateAssertion, there are two additional elements when using MutualCertificate11Assertion: a binary security token representing client's X. The effect of this second signature is to operate as if the client's certificate was used to sign the same parts of the message the primary signature signs.
This is possible because the serialized form of the primary signature follows the XML Digital Signature specification, which means it already contains digested values representing the message parts that require integrity protection.
The second signature will therefore be called an endorsing signature. Computing the endorsing signature is typically less expensive than computing the primary signature simply because the XML representing the primary signature is often smaller than the XML of all the message parts it covers. MutualCertificate10Assertion achieves the same authentication and message protection effect as MutualCertificate11Assertion.
The difference is that it can do its job using only WS-Security 1. The benefit is a greater number of products this assertion will interoperate with. MutualCertificate10Assertion has the same configuration requirements as MutualCertificate11Assertion.
But notice that the wire format shown in Figure 10 is very different. The request contains a binary security token with the client's X.
This token is used directly to sign all the parts of the message that require integrity, including the timestamp. Encryption is done the same way as in AnonymousForCertificateAssertion and MutualCertificate11Assertion: using a symmetric key token encrypted for the service's X.
The response message follows a pattern similar to the request. The message is signed with the service's X. However, the response does not contain a binary security token with the service's X. This is because the client already has this certificate it was used to help encrypt the request , so it is sufficient to provide an external reference to it.
When both the client and service are within the same Kerberos trust domain for example, they are joined to the same Windows domain , Kerberos authentication can be used.
It does not require as much deployment effort as any of the certificate-based authentication assertions supported by WSE, since certificates do not need to be distributed to all participants.
In addition, Kerberos is based on symmetric cryptography, which is faster than public key cryptography. KerberosAssertion does not require any configuration on the service side. The SPN is used by the client to obtain a Kerberos ticket for the target service. Alternatively, you can provide the KerberosToken directly to your proxy in code using the SetClientCredential method:.
There is one limitation of using the SetClientCredential method with Kerberos tokens—the Windows operating system prevents a given instance of a Kerberos ticket from being used more than once in order to prevent replay attacks. This means before making each call, you have to set a new instance of a KerberosToken on the proxy using the SetClientCredential method as shown previously.
Alternatively, if you specify your entire policy in code, you can set a Kerberos token provider on the KerberosAssertion directly.
The token provider acts as a factory of KerberosTokens. Whenever the WSE runtime needs to secure a new request, it calls into this provider to ask for a fresh instance of a KerberosToken. This is how you could write code to set the Kerberos token provider:. Security assertions in WSE provide support for integrity, confidentiality, and client and service authentication. But these assertions do not mitigate a replay attack where an attacker intercepts an acceptable message sent by a valid client and then sends a copy of that message to the service at a later time.
Such attacks are typically mitigated with replay detection, where the recipient can detect and reject duplicate messages. A replay detection feature can be added to WSE by building on the extensibility capabilities of the policy framework.
You first need to make some design decisions. How are you going to determine message uniqueness? Obviously you need to compare some parts of incoming messages. The parts of the SOAP envelope for which you have ensured uniqueness between messages should be signed by an authenticated sender of the message; otherwise, an attacker can circumvent your replay comparison check by modifying the messages, which would pass undetected on the receiver. Ideally, you would be able to compare all the parts that were signed by the sender.
However, this is impractical because XML comparison is computationally expensive, and you would need to store substantial sections of incoming messages in order to prevent future replay attacks. However, if you can assume the parts you care about are digitally signed with the XML Digital Signature required by the WS-Security specification, you have a very concise part of the SOAP envelope that carries enough entropy or randomness for replay detection purposes: the signature value itself.
Using the signature value has three advantages: it carries enough entropy to represent the parts of the message the recipient cares about, it's cheap and easy to compare, and it's compact to store.
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